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Abstract 
We investigate the impact of US steel and aluminum tariffs, and the resumption of auto tariffs 
under the revised North American Free Trade Agreement, on trade in North America and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) from Japan, from the perspective of the auto industry. The results of 
policy simulation analyses with a recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium model are 
as follows. Canada and Mexico would benefit from US steel and aluminum tariffs, being 
alternative trade partners with both the US and other countries. Due to the auto tariffs on intra-
North America exports, Canada and Mexico would lose a large part of the windfall benefits from 
the US steel and aluminum tariffs. Japan’s FDI in Canada and Mexico would fall sharply. The 
more de-integrated North American economies become, the more Japan would regain its auto 
production, although at a painful cost in terms of welfare. That negative welfare impact would be 
neutralized by abolition of auto tariffs with the US.  
 
Keywords 
Economic de-integration; foreign direct investment; auto industry; computable general 
equilibrium analysis 
 
Acknowledgements 
This study is partly supported by JSPS KAKENHI (Nos. 16H0360, 19K01622). Firm-level data 
in the Survey on Overseas Business Activities are provided by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry. The author gratefully acknowledges these sources of support. The usual 
disclaimers apply.
                                                     
*
 Author correspondence: 7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato, Tokyo 106-8677. E-mail: nhosoe@grips.ac.jp. 
  Page 1 
1. Introduction 
 Since the failure of the Doha round, the move towards worldwide economic integration 
and the pursuit of free trade under the regime of the World Trade Organization have stagnated. 
Countries have shifted to alternative pathways of free trade, especially regional and bilateral free 
trade agreements (FTAs). Free trade negotiations, which are motivated by economy-wide benefits 
for each country, cannot ignore neither the political aspects of their impact on industry nor the 
workers left behind or negatively affected. Those negotiations, which incur high costs related to 
both negotiation and maintenance of free trade, have seen the above vulnerable groups suffering 
from impact of the recent populism movements. Member countries of mega-regional FTAs such 
as the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) cannot 
remain unaffected by the centrifugal force pushing toward economic de-integration. Among the 
member countries, the US has been the leading economy in the world and has advocated free 
trade in principle; it has occasionally resorted to protectionist actions against Japan, such as 
government management of trade in sensitive goods including textiles and apparel, 
semiconductors, steel, and automobiles. In 2018, the US government decided to impose 25% and 
10% tariffs on steel and aluminum products respectively, for the purpose of national security 
based on the Trade Expansion Act. The US trade disputes, which mainly targeted Japan in the 
1980s, have now shifted to China, which is growing rapidly and is now the world's second largest 
economic power. Furthermore, the US trade conflicts are backfiring in America's backyard–
Canada and Mexico, the other two NAFTA members–with mutual imposition of sanctions duties. 
 Having experienced a series of trade disputes with the US in the 1980s, Japanese firms 
have made extensive foreign direct investment (FDI) in North America, including Mexico. North 
America attracts a quarter of Japanese FDI, although it is no longer the largest FDI destination, 
given the rapid growth of Asian economies, led by China (Figure 1). Japan's FDI is largely an 
attempt to avoid high trade barriers (including potential ones) to the entry of Japanese products 
to the mega-market of North America. Sales by overseas affiliates of Japanese MNEs are made 
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largely by the transport equipment (auto and parts) industry, followed by chemical sector (Figure 
2). While the auto sector affiliates cover about half of total Japanese affiliate sales globally and 
in US, the auto sector sales are dominant in Canada and Mexico, so both countries can enjoy 
benefits of exporting to the US without tariffs—as long as their products conform to the rules of 
origin (ROOs). Multinational enterprises (MNEs) invest heavily in Canada and Mexico to 
establish platforms there for exporting to the US (Ekholm et al., 2007). Production by Japanese 
auto companies in North America produce 14%, 25%, and 17% of production in the US, Canada, 
and Mexico, respectively.1 Canada, and Mexico to an even greater degree, assemble imported 
parts and export finished products to the US.  
 
                                                     
1
 We use Japanese auto production data from METI's Survey on Overseas Business Activities and local 
production data from the GTAP Database (version 10). See Hertel (1997) for GTAP Database. 
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Figure 1: Japan’s FDI [unit: billion JPY] 
 
Source: Bank of Japan, Direct Investment by Region and Industry. 
 
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Asia N. America L. America Europe Other
  Page 4 
Figure 2: Sales of Overseas Affiliates [unit: billion JPY] 
From top left, world total, US, Canada, and Mexico  
  
 
Source: Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade (METI), Survey on Overseas Business 
Activities. 
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consequently 2.5% in auto tariffs are expected to be resumed.2 These barriers affect supply chains, 
which span all NAFTA members. Disrupting the supply chains would make Canada and Mexico 
less attractive platforms for export to US markets; Japanese FDI might be redirected to the US. 
At the same time, the NAFTA region as a whole becomes a less attractive FDI destination, which 
could decelerate FDI to the US. 
 Many studies have conducted assessments of the impact of NAFTA, with extensive use 
of computable general equilibrium (CGE) models to quantify that impact (Burfisher et al., 2001; 
Francois & Shiells, 1994; Kehoe & Kehoe, 1995) and predict the manner in which NAFTA would 
contribution to the integration and reshaping of the three economies. For example, there is a 
general consensus that among the three countries, Mexico would benefit most from the NAFTA, 
as a result of increased trade. If the survival of NAFTA were at stake, there is concern that the 
NAFTA members would lose amounts as large as or even larger than their gains over the last two 
decades. 
 That concern motivated several assessments of the impact of NAFTA de-integration and 
the establishment of USMCA. Baier, Bergstrand and Bruno (2019), employing a structural gravity 
                                                     
2
 Uchiyama (2019) reports that, according to officials of Mexican automobile firms, passenger cars are 
about to be subject to a 2.5% MFN tariff, which is not so high, and perhaps affordable for them, compared 
with the cost of reorganizing their production processes to meet the new ROOs; and that they can manage 
the new ROOs for pickup trucks, which are slated to be subject to a 25% MFN tariff. Dziczek et al. 
(2018) reports a similar assessment of the Mexican situation. Currently, Japanese companies pay their 
employees high wages, i.e. three times higher than the local minimum wage (90MXN=4.8USD), but they 
cannot afford to pay the high USMCA minimum wage. USITC (2019) estimates that the new ROOs 
would increase production costs of two core components (engines and transmissions) and raise US 
consumer prices by 1.61% for small cars and 0.42% for mid- and full-size cars. These estimates are by 
and large comparable with the impact of the MFN tariff rate of 2.5%. 
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model to simulate a NAFTA breakdown, predict that intra-NAFTA trade volume would be halved 
and that Canada would experience the most serious losses in welfare (measured as real wages), 
followed by Mexico and the US. Lu (2018) simulates an imposition of most-favored nation 
(MFN) tariffs on textiles and apparel products using a CGE model based on GTAP Database 
(version 9).3 The simulation results of an impact assessment of US steel and aluminum tariffs by 
Kawasaki (2018), using a CGE model based on GTAP Database (version 10) (hereafter GTAP10) 
suggest that those tariffs would succeed in protecting the US metal sector but would harm users 
of metal products, such as the electronic equipment, machinery, and auto industries. In terms of 
gross domestic product (GDP), Mexico would lose most, followed by Canada and the US. 
Burfisher et al. (2019) and United States International Trade Comission (USITC) (2019) are the 
most comprehensive studies, examining the agriculture and automobile sectors and market access 
provisions with tariff and nontariff barriers, using GTAP10-based world trade static CGE models. 
 Most of the above assessments, however, do not consider either how FDI would be 
affected by the new barriers posed by the steel and aluminum tariffs and USMCA, or how FDI 
would affect those economies under the new trade regimes. Dhingra et al. (2016) point out in their 
analysis of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU (a.k.a. Brexit) that FDI would exacerbate the 
(negative) impact of economic de-integration; so would it in this USMCA context. USITC (2019) 
is the only study in the group that considers the importance of FDI or MNEs in its USMCA 
analysis using a gravity model to estimate sales losses of foreign affiliates in North America. In 
the GTAP-FDI CGE model they use, the productivity of those affiliates is calibrated to reproduce 
that sales reduction in order to assess its macroeconomic implications. However, its analysis 
suffers two drawbacks. FDI only accompanies sales reductions by foreign affiliates, which is 
estimated outside the CGE model. The GTAP-FDI CGE model is a static model and thus can 
neither examine the evolution of FDI and other key variables over time, nor consider adjustments 
                                                     
3
 See Hertel (1997) for details of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) and its CGE model. 
  Page 7 
to FDI and domestic capital stocks, which are costly to adjust and thus would be accumulated and 
relocated sluggishly. USITC (2019) and Burfisher et al. (2019) include Japan as part of their world 
trade models but do not report impacts on either the Japanese economy or FDI. 
 Uchiyama (2019) argues that Mexico accepted the new USMCA deals, far worse than 
the original ones, to avoid a complete breakdown of NAFTA, which could trigger a capital flight, 
especially of FDI. Indeed, the Mexican macroeconomy has relied heavily on FDI (Blecker, 2009); 
NAFTA has accelerated FDI inflows into Mexico (Cuevas et al., 2005; Waldkirch, 2003). By 
accepting FDI, regional economies have improved productivity (Waldkirch, 2010). This sheds 
light on the role of FDI: Mexico's losses from a resumption of auto tariffs under the USMCA 
could be far larger than its gains from NAFTA, which were demonstrated in earlier studies 
(López-de-Silanes et al., 1994; Markusen et al., 1995). In light of the above, FDI should be 
considered a key variable in our analysis. Aside from the abovementioned studies on FDI in 
Mexico, there are many earlier studies on FDI in the context of NAFTA (Globerman & Shapiro, 
1999; MacDermott, 2007). Krugman & Hanson (1993) examine the impact of a tariff removal 
under NAFTA in terms of locational choice by US firms. Studies in Falck-Reyes & Guzman-
Anaya (2018) examine the roles played by Japanese auto FDI in the Mexican economy by 
examining the regional or firm-level impact of that FDI, but provide only a sketch of the 
macroeconomic aspect. 
 Given this background, we develop a world trade recursive dynamic CGE model which 
allows for international capital mobility in the form of FDI to examine the impacts of economic 
de-integration in North America. We examine the impact of hikes in (a) the US steel and 
aluminum tariffs and (b) auto tariffs between USMCA members; and of (c) hypothetical abolition 
of auto tariffs between the US and Japan, which was not agreed in their trade negotiations in 2019. 
Simulating the impact of the above trade policies, we find that while the steel and aluminum tariffs 
would reduce US auto production considerably, Canada and Mexico would gain from them as 
alternative trade partners in North America. Auto tariff resumption in the USMCA would curb 
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auto production in Canada and Mexico but would not contribute to an increase in US production. 
North American economic de-integration would promote auto production in Japan, inflicting 
collateral damage on Japan’s welfare—although it would be possible to recover that welfare loss 
by means of the auto tariff removal with the US. 
 This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our CGE model and the data used to 
construct it. Section 3 lays out the simulation scenarios. Section 4 presents the simulation results, 
and discusses impacts of economic de-integration in North America in terms of auto production, 
bilateral trade and FDI, and welfare. Section 5 presents conclusions, and indicates future 
extensions of the research reported here. 
 
2. Recursive Dynamic CGE Model 
2.1 Within-period Static Structure 
 In order to quantify impacts of trade barriers arising in North America on North 
American economies, world trade, and Japanese FDI, we develop a world trade recursive dynamic 
CGE model with multi-national enterprises (MNEs) (Hosoe, 2014). The model consists of two 
components. One is a static model part, which describes economic activities within a period, using 
nested-constant elasticity of substitution (CES)/transformation (CET) functions. The other 
component is a dynamic model that links periods with capital accumulation. We distinguish the 
three USMCA members, Japan, and six other regions (Table 1). 
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Table 1: Sectors and Regions  
Sector  Region 
Agriculture  Japan 
Coal  US 
Petroleum  Canada 
Natural Gas  Mexico 
Food*  EU 
Textiles and apparel*  Latin America 
Wood and paper products*  Southeast Asia 
Chemicals*  South Asia 
Oil and petroleum products*  East Asia 
Ceramics*  Rest of the world 
Steel*   
Nonferrous Metals*   
Metal products*   
Transport equipment*   
Electronic equipment*   
Other manufacturing*   
Electricity   
Town gas   
Transportation services   
Other services   
Note: * Sectors with local firms and MNEs 
 
 Each region has 20 sectors, among which 12 manufacturing sectors have two subsectors. 
One subsector is a local-firm sector; the other is a Japanese MNE’s foreign affiliate sector. (Note 
that the local-firm sector can include non-Japanese MNEs’ affiliates. We assume that there are no 
non-Japanese MNEs’ affiliates operating in Japan and the rest of the world.) These two subsectors 
are distinguished on the basis of the nationality of their capital, which is supplied by local 
shareholders or Japanese shareholders in the form of FDI. Material sourcing and product sales 
patterns of Japanese MNEs in the 12 sectors are estimated using data from the Survey on Overseas 
Business Activities and GTAP10 (Figure 3); local firms souring and sales are estimated as 
residuals. While Japanese auto MNEs rely mostly on local input, their export sales from Mexico 
and Canada are mostly directed to the US, not between Mexico and Canada. 
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 Capital is putty-clay type capital, which once installed cannot move among sectors. 
Labor is skilled and unskilled; both are inter-sectorally mobile but internationally immobile. For 
simplicity, we assume all markets are perfectly competitive. 
 
Figure 3: Sourcing of Manufacturing Intermediate Input (top) and Sales Destinations (bottom) 
by Japanese Auto MNEs Sector in North America 
 
 
Source: Author’s estimate, based on the Survey on Overseas Business Activities and GTAP10. 
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used for household and government consumption composite capital good production for 
investment (discussed later), and intermediate input. For details of the static part of the CGE 
model, see the standard CGE model in Hosoe et al. (2010). 
 
2.2 Intertemporal Recursive Dynamics 
 Composite capital good, which is produced with various Armington’s (1969) composite 
goods, is allocated among sectors for investment according to expected sectoral capital service 
price, or rate of returns of capital, in the next period weighted with sectoral capital service input.4 
                                                     
4
 The total investment in the t-th period in the r-th country is allocated among sectoral investment in the i-
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Adding this new capital to the (depreciated) end-of-period capital in the t-th period, we can obtain 
the capital stock in the t+1-th period. By assuming that exogenous variables, such as government 
consumption and capital account deficits, grow at a population growth rate, we generate a 
balanced growth path that serves as a business-as-usual (BAU) path in this analysis. 
 When we calibrate the dynamic part of the model, investment and capital stock data 
(reported in GTAP10) in the reference year of 2014 are not necessarily consistent with the 
assumed balanced growth path. Therefore, we adjust the investment data so that they generate the 
balanced growth path. We execute this calibration and data adjustment process, assuming the rate 
of returns (5%), depreciation rate (4%), population growth rate (2%), and the capital allocation 
elasticity parameter ( =1).5 For our policy simulation, we assume permanent shocks occurring 
in the first period and run the model for 20 years to examine the impact of those shocks on the 
growth paths. 
 The main source of data and parameters is GTAP10. We combine that database with 
Japanese MNEs’ foreign affiliate data (production, sourcing, and sales) from the Survey on 
Overseas Business Activities by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry so as to 
split the 12 manufacturing sectors into local-firm and MNE subsectors. The model is calibrated 
to this modified social accounting matrix.6 
 
3. Simulation Scenarios 
 To simulate trade policy changes impacting on Japanese FDI and the auto sector, we 
prepare the following four scenarios in combination with four different policy shocks (Table 2). 
                                                     
 
5
 We conduct sensitivity analysis with alternative assumptions for these parameters. Results are robust; 
details are reported in the Appendix. 
6
 See Hosoe et al. (2010, Ch.5) for outlines of the calibration method. 
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Table 2: Scenarios and Scenario Factors 
 Shocks 
 US steel and 
aluminum tariff 
Tariff on Mexican 
auto exports to the 
USMCA 
Tariff on Canadian 
auto exports to the 
USMCA 
US-Japan 
auto tariff 
abolition 
Scenario 1: 
Steel and aluminum 
tariff 
X    
Scenario 2: 
Mexican auto export 
tariff 
X X   
Scenario 3: 
Mexican and Canadian 
auto export tariff 
X X X  
Scenario 4: 
US-Japan auto tariff 
abolition 
X X X X 
 
 
- Scenario 1: Steel and Aluminum Tariff  
 We consider tariffs on US steel (25%) and aluminum (10%) imports from non-USMCA 
countries. In our simulation we assume a 25% tariff on steel and metal imports, and a 10% tariff 
on nonferrous metal imports.  
 
- Scenarios 2 and 3: Auto tariffs on Mexican and Canadian Exports 
 On top of Scenario 1, we assume a 2.5% MFN tariff on Mexican auto exports to the US 
and Canada (Scenario 2) and the same tariff on both Mexican and Canadian auto exports to the 
US (Scenario 3), reflecting a situation in which they cannot meet the new ROOs. We assume no 
tariff on US auto exports to these two countries.  
 
- Scenario 4: US-Japan Auto Tariff Abolition 
 On top of Scenario 3, we assume auto tariff abolition between the US and Japan. This 
was one of the major issues in their trade negotiations in 2019, but it was left unresolved. GTAP10 
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reports a 1% tariff on Japanese auto exports to the US and zero tariff on US exports to Japan. This 
constitutes virtually unilateral tariff abolition by the US. 
 In these four scenarios, we do not consider any other trade provisions. That is, we do 
not consider a tariff exemption for steel and aluminum. We omit auto and dairy tariff quotas for 
US imports from the other USMCA members. If auto companies meet the new ROOs, they can 
export without tariffs to the US. In our simulations, we assume that as the new ROOs are too 
costly to meet, auto companies can afford to pay that low tariff. In their simulations, Burfisher et 
al. (2019) implement regional value contents and minimum wages in the ROOs for autos as a 
nontariff barrier and a labor tax, respectively.7 USITC (2019) estimates increases in production 
costs of two core parts for 393 individual vehicle models under the new ROOs and translates the 
cost increases into US auto production losses using a Bertrand-Nash partial equilibrium model. 
In addition, the GTAP-FDI CGE model of Lakatos & Fukui (2014) is used by USITC (2019) to 
estimate an import cost increase that brings the estimated production cost increases in the US, in 
order to estimate macro impacts of its shock. 
 
 We run the model without any shocks and obtain a balanced growth BAU path, where 
all variables but prices grow at the assumed population growth rate (2%). In our policy 
simulations, we examine how much those variables deviate from the BAU path with the shocks 
listed in Table 2. 
 
 
                                                     
7
 They assume that the nontariff barrier halves NAFTA preference margins. The labor tax is set so as to 
increase wage costs by 50%. 
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4. Simulation Results  
4.1 Impacts on Auto Production 
 The US steel and aluminum tariffs (Scenario 1) would contribute to the protection of 
the metal sectors but would harm other domestic industries, especially autos, that use those metal 
products (Figure 4). US auto production would be reduced by 9–13 billion USD (about 1.0% of 
the BAU production level) and would continue to decline. To fill that supply gap, Japan and other 
regions would accelerate production. Canada and Mexico, which are not affected directly by the 
steel and aluminum tariffs, could become alternative production bases for exporting to the US. 
However, due to the tightness of supply chains involving the US, the decline of US auto 
production is propagated negatively to the other two USMCA members, leading to a slight decline 
in their production. 
 
Figure 4: Production of Transport Equipment [Deviations from the BAU Path, billion USD] 
Scenario 1        Scenario 2   Scenario 3     Scenario 4 
 
Note: Total current value of auto production by local firms and MNEs, combined with Laspeyres 
price index. “Other” represents the total of the other six regions. 
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 If auto tariffs are resumed on top of the US steel and aluminum tariffs (Scenario 2), 
Mexican auto production would decline by 1.5% initially but more severely, by 4.5%, in the long 
run. The decline of Mexican auto production provides more room for non-USMCA auto producers 
to grow and for the US to recover slightly from the negative impact of its steel and aluminum 
tariffs, demonstrated in Scenario 1. Canada would be able to recover its production to the BAU 
level in the long run. 
 However, this windfall effect on Canadian production would be completely 
overshadowed by the negative impact of auto tariffs on Canadian (and Mexican) exports, though 
it could be as low as 2.5% (Scenario 3). While initially Canada’s loss (5.3% of the BAU level) 
would exceed Mexico’s, their losses would converge in the long run. The lost production by 
Canada would be covered by non-USMCA members.’ Japan would gain in production by 0.5–
0.6%, compared with the BAU level. 
 Japanese auto exports to the US are subject to a tariff, though it could be as low as 1%. 
Its abolition (Scenario 4) would double the gains in Japan’s production. This additional gain is 
attributable solely to an increase in exports to the US. The other region’s production, targeted at 
exporting to the US, would be reduced accordingly.  
 
4.2 Impacts on Bilateral Trade 
 Figure 5 shows changes in bilateral trade among Japan and the three USMCA members. 
The steel and aluminum tariffs would reduce imports from Japan; their hike in material input costs 
in the US harms its domestic production and its exports. In contrast, Mexico and Canada do not 
impose steel and aluminum tariffs and thus do not suffer input cost hikes. Moreover, as they 
benefit from the same tariff-free access to the US market, Mexican and Canadian exports to the 
US would increase sharply. In terms of magnitude, Canada's gain would be twice that of Mexico. 
Japan would shift the destination of its exports from the US to the other two members, so to avoid 
high US tariffs and to export indirectly to the US, exploiting the advantage of trade with the other 
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two USMCA members. 
 
Figure 5: Bilateral Trade [deviations from the BAU path, billion USD] 
Scenario 1        Scenario 2  Scenario 3     Scenario 4 
 
 
 
In Scenario 2, with a 2.5% tariff on Mexican auto exports to the US and Canada, Mexican exports 
to the US would increase in the short run, when the windfall benefits from the US steel and 
aluminum tariffs would be significant, but would undercut the BAU level in the long run. US 
exports to Mexico would be harmed further. By contrast, bilateral trade between the US and 
Canada would slightly increase. Japanese exports to Mexico and Canada, being affected by the 
fall and rise of these two economies, respectively, would be maintained still slightly above their 
BAU levels. If Canadian auto exports were also tariffed (Scenario 3), trade between Canada and 
the US would be significantly reduced. However, the advantage of the Canadian economy as an 
export base to the US allows Canada to maintain its exports still above the BAU level. 
 While impacting little on other bilateral trade flows, the abolition of US-Japan auto 
tariffs (Scenario 4) would increase Japanese exports to the US by 0.9–1.1%. Accompanying this 
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increase, exports from other regions, especially from major EU and East Asia auto producers, 
would reduce exports to the US (not shown in Figure 5). 
 
4.3 Impacts on Japanese FDI 
 Figure 6 shows the expected impacts on Japanese FDI. The US tariffs on steel and 
aluminum (Scenario 1) make the production of other goods disadvantageous and reduce returns 
from capital installed in the US. On the one hand, this attracts less FDI to the US. Investment 
would exit the US presumably to the other two USMCA members, which are still accessible to 
the US markets. On the other hand, Canada and Mexico are tightly linked with the US through 
their supply chains, and thus would experience collateral damage from the contraction of US auto 
production. These two forces work in opposition; the total impact on Japanese FDI to Mexico and 
Canada would be more or less neutral. Japanese investment would be redirected, partly to the 
domestic sectors and partly to other regions, both of which are less affected by the US tariffs. 
 
Figure 6: Japanese FDI in the Transport Equipment Sector [deviations from the BAU path, billion 
USD] 
Scenario 1        Scenario 2   Scenario 3      Scenario 4 
 
 
 The 2.5% auto tariff, which makes Mexico less attractive as an export platform, would 
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are not subject to the auto tariff, would become more attractive destinations for Japanese FDI. 
Canada in particular would become an alternative export platform to US markets and would 
experience a steady increase in FDI inflows. The US would also regain its attractiveness, albeit 
gradually; in the long run its FDI inflow would return to the BAU level. Given such an outcome, 
the USMCA renegotiation over the auto industry would emerge as successful for the US. 
 If Canada were also subject to the auto tariffs (Scenario 3), it would completely lose its 
advantageous role as an export platform. Like Mexico, it would lose FDI. Canada's FDI loss 
would eventually grow half as large as Mexico’s. Once the US lost both partners, Mexico and 
Canada, could the US be expected to resume its leading role in the auto industry in North 
America? That could not happen. Breaking away from those two partners would fracture the 
supply chains that have been developed across North America in the last quarter century, which 
would in turn reduce the profitability of FDI to the US, and FDI inflows would decrease. 
 Abolition of US-Japan auto tariffs (Scenario 4) would significantly affect Japan's auto 
production (Figure 4) and its exports to the US (Figure 5), but would affect FDI only a little. 
Increases in domestic production and exports of finished products to the US are expected to reduce 
(horizontal) FDI to the US. In contrast, as parts exports would also be bolstered by the zero auto 
tariff, more (vertical) FDI would be needed to accelerate assembly in North America. Between 
exports and FDI, there are substitutive and complementary relationships working in tandem and 
in opposition in modern networked FDI (Baldwin & Okubo, 2014). Therefore, it appears that the 
total impact would be more or less neutral. 
 
4.4 Impacts on Welfare  
 The US would gain slightly (10–13 billion USD) from the steel and aluminum tariffs 
(Scenario 1) (Figure 7). Canada and Mexico would enjoy windfall gains twice as large as those 
of the US, normalized by their GDP. Canada and Mexico's gains would originate from a trade 
diversion effect, which would shift export destinations from the US to Canada and Mexico as a 
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result of the steel and aluminum tariffs (Figure 5). This trade diversion would encompass two 
scenarios: a shift of final export destinations; and a de facto by-pass of exports to the US, with 
some processing in the two countries. Both cases would be beneficial for Canada and Mexico. 
 
Figure 7: Welfare Impacts Measured in Equivalent Variations [% of BAU GDP] 
Scenario 1        Scenario 2   Scenario 3      Scenario 4 
 
 
 Facing an auto tariff (Scenario 2), Mexico would lose the benefit of its USMCA 
membership; part of that benefit would be captured by Canada. If Canada also faced an auto tariff 
(Scenario 3), the gains captured by Canada would be halved. However, the windfall benefit from 
the US steel and aluminum tariffs would be immense for Canada, because Canada's metal exports 
to the US are double those of Mexico.8 Canada would not experience as sharp an FDI flight as 
Mexico. Therefore, Canada would be still better off than the status quo. 
 Economic de-integration measures in North America would pose an obstacle to 
Japanese exports to the US and would reduce returns from Japan’s FDI in Canada and Mexico—
                                                     
8
 GTAP10 reports 302 billion USD in exports of steel, nonferrous metal, and metal products from Canada 
to the US, and 159 billion USD in such exports from Mexico to the US. 
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all of which would negatively impact Japan’s welfare. The abolition of US-Japan auto tariffs 
(Scenario 4) could neutralize the negative welfare impacts of those tariffs in the long run. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 We investigate the impact of economic de-integration in North America via a recursive 
dynamic CGE model. To encompass FDI by Japanese MNEs in the model, we distinguish between 
local firm sectors and Japanese MNE sectors, so as to enable description of substitution and 
complementarity between trade and FDI. Our analysis focuses on trade policies related to the auto 
industry, the target of a large share of Japanese FDI flowing into North America. In our numerical 
analysis, we consider US steel and aluminum tariffs, auto tariffs on Canadian and Mexican exports 
due to stricter ROOs, and abolition of auto tariffs between the US and Japan. The steel and 
aluminum tariff would severely hit the US auto industry through its material cost hike, while 
benefiting those protected sectors. That negative impact would be substantial. Protection at 
Canadian and Mexican borders by means of auto tariffs would not be sufficient for recovery of 
the US domestic auto production level. Since the establishment of NAFTA, supply chains have 
been developed across North America, and intra-industry trade in parts and finished autos has 
been promoted extensively. While tariffs could allow domestic auto producers to bar foreign 
producers from access to their domestic finished-vehicle customers, they might obstruct 
(imported) material supply and thus impact domestic production. Inflicting mutual damage via 
border protection in North America would merely create a supply gap, which could be exploited 
by players outside North America. In terms of welfare, the impact on Mexico would be more 
severe than that on Canada. This finding is consistent with the findings of the majority of earlier 
studies about the gains from NAFTA, although it does contrast with those of Baier, Bergstrand 
and Bruno (2019). 
 Japan would experience collateral damage from North American economic de-
integration. While its domestic auto output and export volumes would grow to replace North 
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American production, Japan would suffer a negative welfare impact resulting from the decline in 
production by its foreign affiliates in North America. FDI to Canada and Mexico America is found 
here to be sensitive to tariff measures. Tariff hikes on Canadian and Mexican exports to the US 
would provide a stronger incentive to jump tariffs by investing in the US, rather than in Canada 
and Mexico. However, at the same time, such hikes would undermine the benefit of the supply 
chains developed over North America, making North America a less attractive FDI destination. 
Therefore, Japanese investment would be directed to regions other than North America or stay in 
Japan. 
 We use data for Japanese MNEs’ foreign affiliates in our simulation study, but we do 
not consider MNEs based in other countries. In the auto industry, major players have developed 
production bases in North America. US auto producers have invested heavily in Canada and 
Mexico. If we include FDI in the scenario, we can expect the impact of economic de-integration 
to be far larger. In this sense, our study provides a lower bound estimate of the negative impact of 
economic de-integration in North America. 
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Appendix Sensitivity Analysis  
 To examine the robustness of our simulation results, shown in the main text, we conduct 
sensitivity analysis with alternative assumptions for six selected key parameters (Table A.1). 
When we assume a larger value for Armington's (1969) elasticity of substitution (), impacts 
of tariff changes on trade are generally larger. Larger trade volume changes lead to larger changes 
in production and FDI. However, welfare impacts are not necessarily larger or smaller under this 
alternative elasticity assumption. Welfare impacts are found larger for Canada and Mexico but 
smaller for the US. This is because the US steel and aluminum tariff (Scenario 1) would US curb 
trade more under this larger elasticity assumption. On the one hand, this allows the US to capture 
smaller rents from other countries by tariffs. On the other hand, the larger trade volume reaction 
would bring a larger trade diversion effect, which would benefit Canada and Mexico. The larger 
elasticity would also augment those country’s losses resulting from the auto tariff imposition 
(Scenarios 2 and 3). As the original welfare impacts for Japan are not sizable, the changes 
resulting from this alternative elasticity assumption are not visible. This alternative elasticity 
assumption alters results quantitatively but does not qualitatively. 
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Table A.1: Assumed Parameters in the Main Text and Alternative Assumptions for Sensitivity 
Analysis 
 Assumed values in the 
main text 
Alternative 
assumption 
Armington's (1969) elasticity of 
substitution:  
1.90–17.2 
(GTAP 10) 
+30% 
Elasticity of substitution among primary 
factor input:  
0.20–1.68 
(GTAP 10) 
+30% 
Depreciation rate:  4% 5% 
Rate of returns: ror 5% 6% 
Population growth rate: pop 2% 3% 
Elasticity parameter of sectoral investment 
allocation function:  
1 2 
 
 Larger elasticity of substitution among primary factor input of capital and skilled and 
unskilled labor () allows economies to adjust their domestic industrial production to shocks 
by means of more flexible reallocation of resources. Therefore, the impacts on production are 
found larger (Figure A.2). However, the quantitative changes resulting from this alternative 
elasticity assumption are small, and there are no qualitative changes in results. Trying alternative 
values for the depreciation rate () and the rate of returns (ror) used for calibration, we find only 
small quantitative differences and thus no qualitative differences in results (Figure A.3 and Figure 
A.4). Assuming a higher population growth rate (pop), the economy would be expected to grow 
faster in the BAU and counterfactual paths. Due to this effect alone, changes shown in level values 
appear larger (Figure A.5). However, when we normalize the impact by the BAU GDPs, results 
are little affected, as shown in welfare impacts. When the elasticity parameter in the sectoral 
investment allocation function () is doubled, investment allocation becomes more sensitive to 
the gap among capital service prices (or rates of returns of capital) of sectors (Figure A.6). As can 
be seen in the figure reporting FDI changes, investment is more quickly adjusted after a shock. 
For example, in Scenarios 3–4, Mexico, which heavily relies on FDI, shows a deeper cut in its 
auto production than Canada. Quicker adjustment reduces deviations from the BAU path in the 
long run. 
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Figure A.1: 30% Larger Armington Elasticity ()  
Production of Transport Equipment [Deviations from the BAU Path, billion USD] 
Scenario1  Scenario2   Scenario3      Scenario4 
 
 
Bilateral Trade [Deviations from the BAU path, billion USD] 
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Japanese FDI in the Transport Equipment Sector [Deviations from the BAU path, billion USD] 
 
 
Welfare Impacts in Equivalent Variations [% of BAU GDP] 
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Figure A.2: 30% Larger Elasticity of Substitution among Primary Factor Input ()  
Production of Transport Equipment [Deviations from the BAU Path, billion USD] 
Scenario1  Scenario2   Scenario3      Scenario4 
 
 
Bilateral Trade [Deviations from the BAU path, billion USD] 
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Japanese FDI in the Transport Equipment Sector [Deviations from the BAU path, billion USD] 
 
 
Welfare Impacts in Equivalent Variations [% of BAU GDP] 
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Figure A.3: 1% Point Larger Depreciation Rate ()  
Production of Transport Equipment [Deviations from the BAU Path, billion USD] 
Scenario1  Scenario2   Scenario3      Scenario4 
 
 
Bilateral Trade [Deviations from the BAU path, billion USD] 
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Japanese FDI in the Transport Equipment Sector [Deviations from the BAU path, billion USD] 
 
 
Welfare Impacts in Equivalent Variations [% of BAU GDP] 
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Figure A.4: 1% Point Larger Rate of Returns (ror)  
Production of Transport Equipment [Deviations from the BAU Path, billion USD] 
Scenario1  Scenario2   Scenario3      Scenario4 
 
 
Bilateral Trade [Deviations from the BAU path, billion USD] 
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Japanese FDI in the Transport Equipment Sector [Deviations from the BAU path, billion USD] 
 
 
Welfare Impacts in Equivalent Variations [% of BAU GDP] 
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Figure A.5: 1% Point Larger Population Growth Rate (pop) 
Production of Transport Equipment [Deviations from the BAU Path, billion USD] 
Scenario1  Scenario2   Scenario3      Scenario4 
 
 
Bilateral Trade [Deviations from the BAU path, billion USD] 
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Japanese FDI in the Transport Equipment Sector [Deviations from the BAU path, billion USD] 
 
 
Welfare Impacts in Equivalent Variations [% of BAU GDP] 
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Figure A.6: Larger Elasticity Parameter for Sectoral Investment Allocation Function (=2)  
Production of Transport Equipment [Deviations from the BAU Path, billion USD] 
Scenario1  Scenario2   Scenario3      Scenario4 
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Japanese FDI in the Transport Equipment Sector [Deviations from the BAU path, billion USD] 
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